The News
November 07, 2007
Martial law not emergency
Plain words
M B Naqvi
Pakistanis are back to August 14, 1947, indeed worse. They had then all the hopes, good intentions and guidance from the Quaid-e-Azam and Liaquat Ali Khan. They had a Constitution of sorts in the Government of India Act 1935, as adopted for Pakistan and the Indian Independence Act of 1947 of the British Parliament. Today they have a Constitution that has been prostituted so many times, frequently kept in abeyance which means it remained non-operative for long periods. Putting it in abeyance was as good as abolishing it for practical purposes because it was kept in technical and theoretical existence simply because to keep the government operations running according to some principles but the purpose of a constitution, insofar as citizens are concerned, was lost. It has again been put in abeyance -- lost totally for common Pakistanis' fundamental rights' enforceability. The real constitution is the whim and decrees of one individual.
What the new Constitution strongly underlines is the absence of stability in the state of Pakistan -- and that after 60 years. It can be argued that Pakistan is actually a failed state. Penny has dropped. Enough experimentation with political systems has been made and none has worked. The military dominates the political life as well as the economy and it hates the limitations that democracy places on it. It has brought Pakistan to the condition in 2007 that makes it one of the most dangerous places not only for foreigners but also for Pakistanis. This is largely as a result of the generals' wisdom. More of this wisdom has to be feared under this new dispensation. Where shall Pakistan go from here is a difficult question to answer.
One would like to ask a simple question: why did the army chief, General Pervez Musharraf, feel it necessary to strike again? He had all the powers that he needed; he commanded all the security forces that Pakistan possesses, including the government and the economy. What more can he get from this emergency? Shackling the media, especially press, sacking the troublesome judges is easy to order and see it executed. This has been tried by all generals and more especially by Gen. Ziaul Haq. It did not pay them much in terms of either gaining legitimacy inside or respect outside. They did not last forever.
It is hard to escape the conclusion that Musharraf moved in order to save his two jobs: as the president as well as army chief. He feared that Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry would disqualify him from being president and his retirement from the army would then be the demand of the other generals. So he has arrested Mr. Chaudhry and other judges, many top-ranking lawyers, opposition politicians, civil society leaders and has cracked down on the media. The purpose of the whole exercise is obvious from reading the PCO's Article 3(2) which reads: "No judgment, decree, writ, order or process whatsoever shall be made or issued by any court or tribunal against the President or the Prime Minister or any authority designated by the President".
It is true that there are many paragraphs beginning with 'whereas it is so and whereas it is this', most of the reasons given for declaring this martial law that is ashamed of taking its own name are simple excuses. What new strategy can Musharraf bring into fighting the Islamic extremism and terrorism that he could not do without the PCO, Emergency and other legal-sounding measures that he issued on Saturday? The real purpose was to fight judicial activism of the Supreme Court and to wash off the effects of lawyers' agitation. He wants to hang on to power in the name of a mission he claims to have. None of us laypersons really know what this mission is other than retaining power.
Talking of the mission the question is: where is Musharraf actually taking Pakistan? He has, insofar as he could, secured both his jobs. He has got rid of troublesome judges and can now deal harshly with troublesome, media and possibly also press, though English language press might escape some of the extra harshness thanks to General Musharraf's friends abroad. But what new factors or forces can he induct into the economy, political life or in the fight against the Talibanisation of Pakistan that is proceeding at a fairly fast pace? Much of today's mess can be attributed to his blunderbuss method of dealing with old ideas in a new garb and context with only the gun. So long as this commando-like thinking continues to guide action, he can think of nothing else but using more force -- hopefully better.
What has the use of mere force in FATA, Swat, and elsewhere yielded? Did he achieve the results he wanted? Pakistan Army has won no victories and the fact that over 250 soldiers of Pakistan, all armed, could surrender to fewer terrorists without firing a single bullet is a worrying thing that ought to have caused the whole nation to introspect. The need is to think deeply about the phenomenon. The point cannot be made too often: ideas can only be replaced by ideas; no gun has yet been invented that can fight an idea. It is hard to say whether this message will ever reach the ears of Pakistan's decision makers.
As for Pakistan citizenry, it had repeatedly to submit to perpetual military domination in the garb of the rule of the Army Chiefs; but there has never been an organized resistance. Pakistanis are commonly thought to be a congenitally docile people, always ready to suffer any ruler. At most times they expect a saviour to come and redeem them. They shy away from thinking for themselves. The idea of relying on their own action to promote their interests is foreign to their minds. But in the course of the long years spent under martial laws and generals' rule, this was largely true. But Pakistanis have also shown that they can also organize protest agitations and general strikes, though generals always ate the fruits of five popular agitations by takeovers of the country without much demur from the people.
But the events of 2007 have proved that there is also more vigorous life in the people than had been attributed to them. After all, there have been popular agitations in 1968-69, 1977 and 1983; they were as vigorous as any the subcontinent has seen. And this year the lawyers and civil society have shown that they can rise to the occasion and inspire and lead the people. Let's see if these new signs of political worth survive. If they do, that will enable the people to eventually create a dispensation in which they count and the state's resources, laws and economy would then primarily aim at people's security, welfare and all human rights.
But there is a downside to it. Lawyers and a few judges and the small civil society alone cannot alter a nation's fortunes. Entrenched systems of tyranny can only be changed by the combined efforts of all the people minus the social and economic elites. This job of leadership is to be performed by political parties and they do not seem to want to do; they think that army's domination is the only show in town. All they think they can do is to cut separate deals with the army chief and the people can be taken for granted. So long as the people do not throw up a new and genuinely democratic leadership, there is no ground to hope, including conclusively dealing with extremist terror.
